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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT E. SIMMONS, CHARRIE
BRENNAN, DAVID A. WILLIAMS,
LOUIE A. SHORT, PATRICIA L.
CASTILLO, BETH L. HURST, and
JAY EZRA REA,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Public Safety, Financial Responsibility Division,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
11771

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This appeal concerns the legality of several driver's
license revocations by the appellant under Utah's Safety
Responsibility Law, Section 41-12-5, Utah Code Ann., as
amended.
DISPOSITION BELOW
Each of the respondents were involved in an automobile accident. Pursuant to the information available to it,
the Public Safety Commission asked for a security deposit.
Upon failure to make said deposit, the Commission revoked
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.the licenses of the respondents. The respondents petitioned
the nistrict Court of Salt Lake County for a review. The
case was heard before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft.
Judge Croft found for the respondents and ruled that additional reports were required before the Commission could
.legally revoke the petitioners' licenses.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversa1 of the lower court's decision
ordering the restoration of the respondents' licenses and
seeks an order in harmony with the decision of the Department of Public Safety.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents in this action were all uninsured motorists who were involved in automobile accidents. Upon
the receipt of various accident reports, body shop estimates,
and personal injury reports, the Public Safety Commission
determined that 'in each accident there was either personal
injury or property damage in excess of one hundred dollars
($100).
Pursuant to the Safety Responsibility Act in Utah, the
Commission set the amount of security deposit which was
required of the uninsured motorist. Upon failure of the
respondents to post security as required by Section 41-12-5,
Utah Code Ann. ( 1960), the Commission suspended their
driver's licenses. That decision was reversed in the lower
court.
Utah Sode Annotated 1953, as amended, shall con-

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
UTAH COURTS MUST GIVE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES BROAD POWERS IN MAKING DECISIONS.
According to a Utah decision, the administrative agencies should be given a free hand when dealing with their
statutory responsibilities. In the case of Ricker v. Board
of Ed. of Millard County School Dist., 16 Utah 2d 106, 396
P. 2d 416 ( 19'64), the court said:
" . . . It is the policy of the law not to favor
limitations on the powers of the administrative
body, but rather to give it a free hand to function
within the sphere of its responsibilities. For that
reason, it is to be assumed that the board has and
retains its prerogative of using its best judgment
... ". Id., 16 Utah 2d at 111, 396 P. 2d at 420.
In line with this reasoning is the general principle
that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in hearings
before administrative agencies. This principle was correctly stated by Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1009,
,59 N. W. 2d 784 (1953), as follows:
"We think it inescapable that the legislature
intended to give permit-issuing bodies wide discretion in revocations. They are not required to wait
upon criminal convictions; they need not give notice
or hold hearings; they are quite apparently not
bound by technical rules of evidence. They need
have before them only something which fairly shows
cause which, in their judgment, indicates a continuation of the license will be inimical to the purposes
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of chapter 124. The nonapplication of rules of evidence is demonstrated when it is considered that
since no hearing i6 necessary there would be no one
to object to offered proof and no one to cross-examine." (Emphasis added.) Id., 59 N. W. 2d at
791.

POINT II.
IN THE'SE CASES THE COMMISSION HAD
rSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSPEND THE
LICENSES OF THE UNINSURED MOTORISTS.
To support its actions, the Commission relied upon six
(6) basic types of evidence. These were:
1.

Tihe accident report filed by the investigating officer.

2.

The accident report filed by the insured motorist.

3.

The accident report filed by the uninsured motorist.

4.

Body Bhop estimates of the cost to repair the damages.

5.

Personal injury reports filed by injured drivers
and passengers, which were all signed by a physician.

6.

In one case (Beth Hurst) there was also a letter

from the insured motorist.
None of this evidence was controverted. None of the
reports, not even those filed by the uninBured motorist,

estimated the damages at less than $100.
According to i:Jhe Utah statute, the Commission (Department of Public Safety) is given specific approval to
use the accident reports required by Section 41-6-35. The
statute states :
"Report of accident required by section 41-6-35,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, shall contain information to enable the commission to determine whether requirements for deposit of security under section 41-12-5 are inapplicable by reason
of the existence of insurance or other exceptions
specified in this act. The commission may rely

upon the accuracy of the information unless and
until it has reason to believe that the information is
erroneous ... The operator or the owner shall furnish such additional relevant information as the
commission shall require." (Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-4 (1960).

The Safety Responsibility Act continues by pointing
out that if the Commissi.on receives an accident report
which shows e'ither one hundred dollars ($100) in property
damage or any bodily injury, the Commission shall determine the amount of security required to be deposited by
the uninsured motorist unless he is specifically excepted by
the statute. Section 41-12-5 (a), Utah Code Ann. (1960)
continues by stating:
". . . The comm1ss10n shall determine the
amount of security deposit upon the basis of the
reports or other evidence submitted to it but shall
not require a deposit of security for the benefit of
1any person when evidence has not been submitted
by such person or on his behalf as to the extent of
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his injuries or the damage to his property within
fifty ( 50) days following the date of the accident
..." UtaJh Code Ann. § 41-12-5 (a) (1960).
The clear meaning of this statute is to equate the submitted reports to evidence. All the needed reports sholllld
be on file, and if not, the person suffering property damage or injuries has fifty days in which to submit reports.
If there is a dispute as to the amount of damage or injury,
the statute is clear that the injured or harmed person must
,submit a report if he is to benefit from this statute. As
Section 41-12-4 points out - if additional relevant information .is needed. the Commission will require it.
In the case at bar, the question to be decided is whether
the Department of Public Safety, Financial Responsibility
Division, is justified in suspending a driver's license when
it is presented with ( 1) the investigating officer's report;
(2) a report filed by the other driver; (3) an estimate of
damage by a body shop; and ( 4) a report by an examining
physician; :all of which estimate the damage at more than
one hundred doMars ($100). The specific clause in question
reads as follows :
"
( B) ut (the commission) shall not require
a deposit of security for the benefit of any person
when evidence has not been submitted by sucih person or on his behalf as to the extent of his injuries
or the damage to hiis property within fifty ( 50)
days following the accident." Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-12-5 (a) (1960).
The Commission had reports submitted by or on behalf
of the person injured. The fifty day time period is for

7

additional reports if required by the Commission or for
additional reports to modify or enlarge the amounts of
damage or pe:r:sonal injury.
In the case at bar, none of the amounts were questioned, nor was there an attempt to modify the stated
amounts. Therefore, nothing more wa:s needed. The Commission had ample evidence upon which to base its claim.
It is immaterial rwhether or not the same reports are required by another statute; the Commission had sufficient
evidence for its conclusion.
POINT III.
THESE RESPONDENTS ARE EX.A:CTLY THE
TYPE OF MOTORISTS THE STATUTE WAS
DESIGNED FOR.

In his decision, Judge Croft pointed out how grossly
unfair the statute seemed to him as he applied the following
facts to the statute:
"Even if an injured party concludes within 60
days after the accident that his own fault caused
the accident, all of the reports and information collected by the commission would be on hand from
which a determination of damage might be made.
To then say that even though the injured party did
not intend to seek recovery for his damages, the
commission can nevertheless require security and
suspend a license if not filed, seems grossly unfair."
(R. at 124).
The facts are not applicable to the instant case. But
even if those facts did arise, the proper .solution under our
statute is for the uninsured person to secure and submit a

document showing he haJs obtained 1a release from liability.
Uta'h Code Ann. § 41-12-5(a) (1960). The same principle
wais correctly stated in Agee v. Kansas Highway Comm'n
Motor Vehicle Dept., 198 Kan. 173, 422 P. 2d 949 (1967)
as foUows:
"We might add at this point that our Act contains provisfons for relieving a person, otherwise
liable, from the necessity of depositing security
when he hJas either been relea:sed from liability by
the other parties to an accident, been adjudicated
not Hable in a court of law, or has entered into a
wri,tten agreement for payment of all claims arising
from an accident." Id., 422 P. 2d at 954..
The purpose of financial responsibility laws is to give
monetary protection to :
". . . that everchanging and tragically large
group of persons who while lawfully using the highways themselves suffer grave injury through the
negligent use of those highways by others." Mission
Insurance Company v. Feldt, 41 Cal. Rptr. 293 at
296, 396 P. 2d 709 at 712 ( 1964).
For this reason the Financial Responsibility Law must be
liberally construed to foster its main objectives.
Under the facts of our case, the Commission had several reports, each placing the amount of injury or property
damage above one hundred dollars ( $100) . Merely because
the plaintiffs could not or did not obtain a release of liability or because the p'1aintiffs could not provide the security required is no reason why the statute should be construed narrowly. The case of Agee v. Kansas Highway
Comm'n Motor Vehicle Dept., supra, aptly st::tted the general view:

"A second ground alleged for vacating the suspension order was that Agee could neither obtain
releases from the other parties to the accident nor
provide the security required. This argument is
pure sophistry. The provisions of the Act requiring
security are directed against just such an individual. Inability, eifuer to secure releases from
others involved in the accident, or to provide security as required by the Department, is cause for
entering an order of suspension, not for vacating
one." Id., 422 P. 2d at 955.
1

Once the statute is construed in the favor of the public,
as it should be, it is easily noted thaJt the plaintiffs-respondents are exactly the type of motorists the statute was
designed to keep off the highway.
CONCLJUSION
Appellant respectfully requests thalt for the reasons
above stated, this appeal should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Appellant

